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Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Defendant/Appellant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (hereinafter 
"Union"), by and through its attorneys of record, Joseph E. Hatch and Arthur F. 
Sandack, file this Reply Brief, as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I A COUPLE OF MIS-DESCRIBED FACTS. 
Except for the different uses of adjectives and adverbs, there is little dispute 
between the parties as to the factual background of this case. Of course, the parties 
strongly disagree on the facts and circumstances surrounding the issue of whether or 
not the Plaintiff/Appellee Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA") had violated 
state law by failing to bargain with the Union in good faith. However, those disputed 
facts are not for resolution with this appeal. 
Despite a concurrence in the description of the facts, the Union believes that 
the UTA mis-described two relevant facts in its Brief. First, on page 9 of its Brief, 
the UTA asserts that.. ."there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect at the 
time that this case was initiated in the district court..." In other words, the UTA 
argues that the C.B.A. between the parties had "expired" on December 21, 2009. The 
Union submitted that the C.B.A. had not "expired". Therefore, a C.B.A. did exist 
when the UTA filed the subject declaratory judgment action in state court. 
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The above dispute over whether or not the C.B.A. had expired on December 
21, 2009, was arbitrated by the parties and Arbitrator Axon ruled that the C.B.A. had 
not expired. His ruling specifically found that the UTA violated the Section 13(c) 
Arrangement by imposing terms and conditions of employment on December 21, 
2009, and awarded that "all terms and conditions of the expired Collective 
Bargaining Agreement shall be made retroactive to December 21, 2009." (See page 
35 of the Arbitrator Board's Opinion and Award dated December 11, 2010). This 
means that, on the date that the UTA filed this declaratory judgment action, the 
parties were subject to a C.B.A. and therefore party to two separate agreements with 
arbitration clauses. 
Although the Union with its motion to compel arbitration did not raise the 
arbitration clause contained in the "expired" C.B.A., this does not mean that in the 
future the Union would not argue that certain unfair labor practices could be a 
violation of the C.B.A. and subject to arbitration pursuant to the parties' C.B.A. This 
point was specifically presented to the trial court during oral argument on this matter. 
(See pp. 6-7 of R. 741). 
Secondly, also on page 9 of the UTA's Brief, it is stated that "[pjursuant to the 
13(c) arrangement, either UTA or the Union has the option of involving "fact-
finding" proceedings in the event that the parties are not able to reach agreement after 
7 
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60 days of bargaining over a collective bargaining agreement." This position by the 
UTA has been expressly rejected by Arbitrator Axon in his decision. 
Under the Section 13(c) Arrangement, "fact-finding" can not be invoked until 
60 days after a "labor dispute" arises "regarding the making or maintaining of a 
collective bargaining agreement". The UTA has argued that such a labor dispute 
exists the moment the parties sit down to discuss the terms for a new C.B.A.; the 
Union showed that a labor dispute, for purposes of invoking "fact-finding", does not 
arise until the UTA stopped making any meaningful proposals during a negotiation. 
Because of Arbitrator Axon's decision, the parties could not have invoked the 
"fact-finding" provisions of the Section 13(c) Arrangement in October of 2009, as 
alleged by the UTA, but would have had to wait until January 12, 2010. This is 
important because it demonstrates how the UTA rushed unilaterally to declare 
impasse and to imposing terms and conditions of employment three weeks before 
either party could have even invoked "fact-finding". It is the facts and circumstances 
behind this UTA rush to declare impasse and otherwise refusal to bargain which the 
Union desires to have an arbitrator decide whether or not there was a violation of the 
Section 13(c) Arrangement. 
3 
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POINT II THIS CASE IS NOT MOOT, 
The first matter that this Court must decide is whether, in light of several post-
appeal events, the UTA's suggestion of mootness is well taken. Although their 
suggestion was well presented in the memorandum filed by both parties, the UTA 
raised a number of new points with its Brief upon which the Union desires to 
comment. 
First, the UTA has altered its request of this Court since the UTA filed the 
suggestion of mootness. In the submittal, the UTA plead that.. ."there is no longer 
any meaningful relief that can be granted, and the appeal is moot and should be 
dismissed." (See page 2 of Appellee's Suggestion of Mootness dated July 8, 2011). 
However, with its Brief, the UTA now argues 
that the substantive dispute in labor practices was rendered moot by 
the decision of Arbitrator Axon in the arbitration conducted pursuant 
to the 13(c) Arrangement, and that this Court should only decide only 
the procedural issue and then dismiss the case as moot. 
(See p. 30 of Brief of Appellee.) Although the Union welcomes this change in views 
by the UTA, the Union, of course, does not believe the change in views goes far 
enough. The Union, as was articulated in its memorandum filed with this Court, still 
believes that the facts and circumstances, surrounding the UTA's rush to declare 
impasse and then its inappropriate and unilateral imposing terms and conditions of 
4 
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employment, are still ripe for arbitration and it is solely within the purview of the 
arbitrator to decide. Whether or not the substantive issues raised by the allegation, 
that the UTA had failed to negotiate in good faith, are moot is for an arbitrator to 
decide. Courts have no authority to delve into or on the merits of issues subject to 
arbitration. Mootness is a court fashioned doctrine that applies to cases properly 
before the court on its merits. 
Second, the UTA is wrong when it asserts that there are no remedies available 
for the UTA's alleged failure to bargain in good faith with the Union. Although it is 
correct that the most common remedy, restoration of status quo ante, has been 
ordered; other significant remedies, as described in the Union's filed memorandum, 
are available. Possibly the most significant remedy, a cease and desist order, is 
available for an arbitrator to describe expressly, using the facts and circumstances 
between August 2009 and December 21, 2009, to determine what is meant by good 
faith collective bargaining under Utah laws. 
Third, the public policy reasons why this Court should rule upon the procedural 
issues of this case, as is advocated by both the UTA and Union, equally apply to why 
it is important for both parties to fully understand what behavior is expected of them 
when negotiating the terms and conditions of a new collective bargaining agreement. 
The citizens of this state have the right to expect that both the Union and UTA will 
5 
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engage in good faith bargaining and to benefit from the resulting labor peace and 
higher productivity which are the products of successful collective bargaining. 
Fourth, although Arbitrator Axon has definitively defined some of the rules for 
collective bargaining between the Union and the UTA, this does not mean that there 
are no longer significant disputes between the parties, resolution of which will assist 
any future negotiations. The UTA engaged in certain negotiation tactics during 2009. 
The Union has argued that those tactics, taken as a whole, constituted bad faith 
bargaining. Nothing has happened which would render any of those negotiating 
tactics, with the exception of imposing terms and conditions of employment prior to 
the utilization of fact-finding, as legally inappropriate until an arbitrator or a court 
rules in this case. Those issues were not before Arbitrator Axon. 
Finally, it is true that the Union has not answered the complaint or 
counterclaim with any action alleging unfair labor practices. All the Union did was 
to move for a stay of the district court proceedings and to compel arbitration of its 
grievance and issues before the court including UTA's allegations that it was entitled 
to unilaterally implement new terms of employment because it had bargained in good 
faith to impasse. If the UTA believes its court complaint is moot, it would be free to 
dismiss the complaint, should the UTA's claims be subject to the court's jurisdiction. 
6 
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For these reasons and other previously addressed by the Union, the Court 
should not determine the matter as moot. 
POINT III THE UTA IS MISINTERPRETING JACKSON TRANSIT. 
UTA's principal contention is that the U.S. Supreme Court case 
of Jackson Transit requires that labor disputes, involving good faith 
collective bargaining, must to be litigated in state court and are not 
subject to arbitration. This argument is entirely lacking in merit. 
Jackson Transit says nothing about abrogating state law compelling 
arbitration pursuant to a Section 13(c) Arrangement or pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement. Quite the contrary, arbitration is a 
fundamental and widely accepted tool for resolving labor disputes. In 
this controversy, arbitration was determined by the Secretary of Labor 
to be the forum where such a good faith bargaining labor dispute is to 
be resolved. 
The Union did not attempt "to minimize" the Jackson Transit ruling in its brief 
as UTA claims at page 14 of its Brief. Rather, the Union cited to Jackson Transit to 
provide the legal landscape for this dispute and why the Union was required to 
enforce the arbitration provisions of the Section 13(c) Arrangement in state court 
7 
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rather than in federal court. Jackson Transit holds there is no federal-question 
jurisdiction to enforce arrangements or collective bargaining agreements under § 13c 
the Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 USC § 5333(b) (herein "UMTA"). Even the 
UTA's review of this case, when it is boiled down, stands for nothing more than this. 
However, the UTA claims much more by making unsupported assertions on 
pages 18-19 of its Brief where the UTA states: 
Given the Supreme Court's express direction in Jackson 
Transit, it is plain that the Union's demand to arbitrate the 
underlying dispute in this case - that is, whether UTA bargained 
in good faith to the point of impasse- directly contravenes the 
intent of congress and cannot be granted. On the contrary, this 
is manifestly an issue of state law that must be decided by state 
courts. 
UTA continues on page 19 of its Brief to contend that the Union, in seeking an order 
compelling arbitration, 
ignores the Supreme Court's direction in Jackson Transit and instead 
points to UTA's 13(c) Arrangement, which includes a requirement 
that UTA provide for the continuation of collective bargaining, as an 
arbitration clause. Indeed, the Union quotes language from the 13(c) 
Arrangement [at \3] that, taken out of context, appears to create an 
independent duty to collectively bargain with the Union ... The Union 
then cites to the 13(c) Arrangement's arbitration clause, and argues 
that the UTA must arbitrate the issue of whether it bargained in good 
faith, as if [^3 of the 13(c) Arrangement somehow preempts the [Utah] 
statutory requirement [for collective bargaining] found in Section 813. 
UTA asserts that arbitration "would frustrate the intent of the UMTA (as explained 
by the Supreme Court) and would interfere in the orderly development of Utah labor 
8 
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law" such that allowing arbitration would "effectively cede control of state labor laws 
to the federal government, contrary to the... decision of Jackson Transit.''(See UTA's 
Brief, pp. 19-20). 
UTA has grossly mischaracterized the Union's position. The Union did not 
ignore directions in Jackson Transit. It in fact asked the state court to enforce the 
arbitration agreement rather than attempt to remove the case to federal court. Jackson 
Transit says nothing about usurping state arbitration law; if anything that case 
supports state arbitration laws. The Union is not trying to pre-empt state collective a 
bargaining law but trying to enforce the law through a motion to compel arbitration 
the provisions of the Section 13(c) Arrangement as the Secretary of Labor 
specifically required. 
UTA entirely fails to connect the dots between what it says Jackson Transit 
does and what UTA claims for it, that litigation of the collective bargaining dispute 
regarding a state law is required to be enforced in state court, regardless of any 
independent duty under the Section 13(c) Arrangement to arbitrate it. 
If UTA's contentions are accepted, there would be no place for arbitration of 
collective bargaining disputes, even under collective bargaining agreements. UTA 
could always claim a right to take any transit employment action toward represented 
employees under state collective bargaining law that only a court could determine if it 
9 
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was lawful. This flies in the face of state and federal policies determining arbitration 
to be a favored remedy which courts should enforce liberally, as discussed at pages 
26-27 of the Union's Brief. 
The United States Supreme Court has as well stated that the grievance 
arbitration procedure is 
the very heart of the system of industrial self government. 
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by 
molding a system of private law for all the problems which may 
arise and to provide for all their solution in a way which will 
generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the 
parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance 
machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content 
is given to the collective bargaining agreement. 
.. .The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the 
continuous collective bargaining process. 
Steelworkers v Warrior Gulf& Navigation Company 363 US 574, 581 (1960). 
Certainly the Secretary of Labor knew arbitration's place by including it in the 
Section 13(c) Arrangement which UTA agreed by accepting substantial federal 
transportation grants. If the UTA does not want to arbitrate, it could have always 
sought to eliminate the clause by asking the Secretary of Labor to change the 
Arrangement in that regard. However, it is improper for the UTA to ask the court to 
eviscerate the arbitration clause. 
10 
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Jackson Transit arose out of an action against the Secretaries of Labor and 
Transportation for their alleged failure to carry out their duty under the 13(c) 
protections of the UTMA and enforce a collective bargaining agreement which 
Jackson City allegedly unlawfully abrogated. 
In Jackson Transit, the U.S. District Court found the Secretaries of Labor and 
Transportation were not parties to the C.B.A. and had no continuing duty to enforce 
the C.B.A. under the 13(c) Arrangement. See 447 F Supp 88 at 91-92. The district 
court held there was no federal-question jurisdiction for the Union's claims against 
the Secretaries and no pendant jurisdiction against the city of Jackson to enforce the 
C.B.A. or its arbitration provision. The District Court found the action did not give 
rise to a claim for breach of the UMTA, itself, which was intended "only secondarily" 
to protect collective bargaining rights. Id at 93. The District Court stated that the 
overwhelming case law held that the "Union's right of action draws its vitality from 
the collective bargaining agreement, enforceable under state law, rather than the 
provisions of the UMTA." 447 F Supp 88 at 94. The District Court added: 
Moreover, this court is convinced that plaintiffs right of 
collective bargaining will not be lost if this matter is left to state 
law on the basis of a breach of contract or arbitration claim.... 
This court is' not inclined to find that federal law has pre-
empted state remedies as claimed by plaintiff. Tennessee Code 
Annotated (citation omitted)... specifically authorizes 
Tennessee cities and transit authorities, such as those involved 
n 
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here, to arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of any collective 
bargaining agreement, (underlining added) 
447 F Supp at 94. 
Thus, the District Court recognized the role of the state in enforcing arbitration 
agreements. While the Utah transit statute does not expressly authorize arbitration as 
Tennessee does, Utah does implicitly recognize arbitration as part of the "remedies of 
the 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act...., as determined by the Secretary of 
Labor" that apply to the Utah public transportation system. See U.C.A. § 17B-2a-
813(1). 
The Federal Court of Appeals reversed the District Court finding federal-
question jurisdiction allowing for a private cause of action, as supported by numerous 
decisions, to enforce interest arbitration awards. It found that the Jackson Transit 
dispute indeed presented even a stronger federal question because the UMTA did not 
explicitly require interest arbitration, as enforced in the other cases, but the UMTA 
did require "collective bargaining rights." 650 F 2d 1379 at 1383. (CA 6 1981) 
The US Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals holding that 13(c) of the 
UMTA does not establish federal causes of action for alleged breached that statute or 
collective bargaining contracts contemplated under the statute. It stated u[t]he precise 
question before us is whether the union's contract is a federal cause of action, not 
whether the union can bring suit at all to enforce its contracts." 457 U.S. at 21. The 
i? 
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court concluded based on the legislative history, that Congress intended labor 
relations between transit workers and a local government receiving federal transit aid 
to be controlled by state law. 457 U.S. at 24. "Congress intended that 13(c) would be 
an important tool to protect collective bargaining rights of transit workers, by 
ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid could be used could be 
used to convert private companies into public entities." 457 U.S. at 27-28 (1982). 
Accordingly the court held it could not "read 13(c) agreements to create federal cause 
of action for breaches of § 13(c) agreements and collective bargaining contracts 
between UMTA recipients and transit unions." 457 U.S. at 29. 
Nowhere does Jackson Transit hold or even suggest that the Supreme Court 
was supplanting the role of arbitration as a means of enforcement. Nor could the 
Supreme Court do this, as it recognized the question was not within its jurisdiction. 
Incredulously, UTA argues at page 20-2 1 of its Brief that Paragraph %3 of the 
Section 13(c) Arrangement is a "belt and suspenders" provision "that would only 
come into play if there were no applicable state statute" providing for collective 
bargaining. Whatever is meant by the term "belt and suspenders", this argument is 
nonsensical. If Utah had no collective bargaining rights for transit workers, there 
would be no f3 because there would be no Section 13(c) Arrangement because there 
would be no federal transit aid under the UMTA. 
13 
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The UTA and the state of Utah clearly understands the necessity of a state law 
enabling collective bargaining rights for transit workers to obtain federal grants to 
support the transit projects. Utah has set them forth in the statute in bare bones 
fashion. As UTA recognizes in its discussion of the Donovan case at page 18 of its 
brief, state law must incorporate basic federal policy which "require at a minimum 
good faith negotiations, to the point of impasse." And the federal policy requiring 
arbitration is explicitly set forth in the Section 13(c) Arrangement at ^ [8. 
Nevertheless at pages 23-24 of its brief, UTA argues it never agreed to arbitrate 
claimed violations of Section 813 of Utah law establishing collective bargaining 
rights. Yet UTA recognizes this statutory provision was the very condition for federal 
financial assistance. See pages 15-16 of its Brief. And such rights are exactly what 
the Section 13(c) Arrangement at [^3 preserves and protects in giving the aid, when it 
states "[t]he collective bargaining rights of employees represented by the Union 
including the right to arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes..., as provided by 
applicable laws policies and/or existing collective bargaining agreements shall be 
preserved and protected The Public Body [UTA] agrees, that it will bargain 
collectively with the Union..." 
Accordingly, the Union submits the Court should enforce the Section 13(c) Arrangement by 
requiring arbitration of the good faith bargaining issues pursuant to state law. 
14 
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POINT IV ARBITRATION IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTENT OF 
CONGRESS, 
UTA next falls back on unsupported claims and shotgun arguments at pp. 22-
29 of its Brief to claim that arbitration conflicts with congressional policy as declared 
by the Supreme Court. Among its contentions the UTA claims it has never agreed to 
arbitrate the Union's grievance, that out of state arbitrators lack special expertise on 
bargaining issues or are ill equipped to apply Utah law, and that allowing arbitrators 
to decide other cases is contrary to Utah public policy. It goes so far as to argue the 
merits of the case, that the district court reserved for trial, which the UTA did bargain 
in good faith.1 See pp. 28-29 of UTA's Brief. 
The Union has already addressed the contentions that arbitration is indeed 
favored by public policy and the UTA agreed to arbitrate the dispute. The other 
arguments have nothing to do with the real issue on appeal but are briefly addressed. 
If labor arbitrators are so deficient and ill equipped, why would the Secretary of 
Labor require arbitration at [^8 of the Arrangement? The Secretary has the labor 
expertise to have confidence in the disputes resolution process. 
The NLRB as well by established policy, routinely defers to labor arbitrators on 
unfair labor charges for failure to bargain under its Collyer doctrine. See Collyer 
Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). 
The District Court only granted partial summary judgment on the issue as to whether the dispute was arbitrable 
not whether it bargained in good faith to impasse or was entitled to implement new terms. 
15 
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There is no need to get into a prolonged discussion of Collyer, or the evidence, 
or lack thereof, of the expertise of arbitrators in address these issues. The 
Arrangement calls for arbitration of "any labor dispute or controversy ... regarding 
the application, interpretation or enforcement of this Arrangement." This collective 
bargaining dispute is grist for the mill of that remedial process and exactly what was 
intended for it. It is not for the court to substitute its judgment for the Secretary of 
Labor when it comes to determining if it is appropriate or not in the Arrangement 
which UTA accepted. 
CONCULSION 
For the reasons advanced in its Briefs, the Union request this Court 
reverse the Order of the District Court, compel arbitration of the labor dispute 
between the UTA and the Union, and stay the district proceedings until the arbitration 
has been completed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 2011. 
JOSEPH E. HATCH 
Attorney for the Union 
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